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Background: Two alternative procedures currently exist for efficient carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions control: carbon
emission trading and proportional carbon tax. This article explores which of the two is more desirable and
efficacious.
Results: Compared to emission trading, the equilibrium under a universal proportional carbon tax achieves Pareto
superior allocation. In addition, the price of a unit of CO2 emissions is much higher in the case of a universal
proportional carbon tax than for bilateral emissions trading.
Conclusions: This paper reveals the superiority of a universal proportional carbon tax over the emissions trading in
terms of the efficiency of CO2 emissions control. However, deciding and abiding by a universal tax rate is likely to
require great political will. In this sense, viewed in the current context, such a tax scheme is visionary. Gradualism is
unavoidable. It is far more desirable to expand the network of the upcoming trilateral carbon trading network
steadily rather than leaving the global economy to the laissez-faire situation.
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Carbon markets are jerry-built in naturea. They cannot
be sufficiently sustained without government assistance and
intervention. According to Lovins and Cohen (2011), p.227,
“In the wake of the world’s failure to agree on a new trading
legislation in Copenhagen and the U.S. Senate failure to
pass binding legislation, the price of carbon fell drastically.
In the United States it fell almost to nothing. In Europe, the
price of carbon fell from a high of €25 to €8 a ton. By
October 2010, prices had started to rebound, hitting
€12. Subsequent measures have only strengthened the
price per ton”.
First, this article explores the source of such fragility.
We find that the decisions of economic agents emitting
carbon dioxide (CO2) are isolated from direct and
indirect damages due to such emissions, owing to the
genuine property of their external diseconomy of the
emission; therefore, at the very least, the market cannot
remain sustainable without expectations of strengthened
regulation in the future.Correspondence: ohtaki@iss.u-tokyo.ac.jp
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medium, provided the original work is properlySecond, we examine the properties of bilateral offset
carbon trading, which is currently the most popular trading
scheme and is not subject to regulation concerning total
emission amounts. Unlike Otaki (2013), although the
analysis is static, the extension to dynamic analysis is not
impossible, since the latter is an application of cap
trading which regulates total emissions. Moreover, analysis
pertaining to cap trading, which seems to be popular within
the European market, requires the consideration of only
one additional constraint concerning total emissions in the
model.
Finally, we compare the function of bilateral carbon
trading with that of a universal proportional carbon tax.
The article concludes that although a wide-ranged
universal proportional carbon tax is superior to bilateral
carbon trading, the tax rate becomes extremely high and
impractical, and hence, expanding the network of




Assume that two types of countries exist. One of the
countries is an advanced industrialized or developedaccess article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
y/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any
cited.
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oping country that does not emit CO2. There are n pairs
of a developed and a developing country (dj, uj) between
which the emission right is traded, where dj and uj are
the j th developed and developing country respectively,
comprising the j th block of emission trading.
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where cij and e
i
j denote the consumption and CO2 emis-
sion level of the j th country that belongs to type i
(i = d, u), respectively. Ψ represents the disutility from
the CO2 emission via the production process of a
consumption good. We assume that Ψ is linear
homogenousb, quasi concave and symmetric in the fol-
lowing sense. That is,
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This symmetric assumption implies that the disutility
derived from the emission does not depend on where it
is emitted. It is a plausible assumption when we consider
the diffusion speed of CO2 in the atmosphere.
The semi-reduced form production function, which
represents the relationship between the consumption c
and the adjoined emission e, is c = α F (e), α is some
positive constant.
F 0 > 0; F 00 < 0; e < eð Þ: F 0 ¼ F 00 ¼ 0; e≥eð Þ: ð3Þ
That is, F(∙) means that if a factory emits CO2 by
weight e, it produces c units of goods. e is the maximal
effective CO2 emission in the sense that the emission
exceeding this limit bears no additional consumption
goods.
We assume that only developed countries possess the
production technology. No developing country can ac-
cess such an opportunity until the bilateral emission
trading is settled or some type of proportional carbon
tax is levied.
The complete laissez-faire situation
Assume that, in the laissez-faire situation, the decisions
of the production sectors within a country are separated
from the consumer sector; they do not consider the
nuisance incurred by their emission. Hence, they pro-
duce goods amounting to the maximum level F eð Þ . In
such a case, the unit price of carbon is zero.
As noted by Lovins and Cohen (2011), ch.8 and
evidenced by history, this fact implies that withoutgovernment intervention, the carbon market will surely
collapse and the unit price of carbon will fall and
become negligible.
Unilateral proportional carbon tax: implementation of the
Nash equilibrium
Formatting a unilateral proportional carbon tax
Moving from the complete laissez-faire situation, each
country is separately incentivized to levy a carbon tax to
suppress its emissions for its own wellbeing, and thus, a
unilateral proportional carbon tax is formatted by the






































Since the solution of this problem satisfies
F 0 ekl






we find that the allocation implemented by a unilateral






 is identical to that implemented by
the Nash equilibrium of an international game of CO2
emission. In this sense, a unilateral proportional carbon
tax belongs to a kind of international laissez-faire
scheme and does not require any cooperative behavior
between countries. However, it is evident that the re-
source allocation is improved compared with the
complete laissez-faire situation, because the equilibrium
emissions are determined by weaving the social disutility
from excess emissions.
Bilateral emissions trading
Formatting the bilateral emission trading scheme
Bilateral emissions trading between the developed and
the developing country in the j th pair is defined by the


























where P is the total payment for the carbon emissions. *
denotes the optimal contract emissions of the other
pairs. λ is the Lagrangean multiplier of this problem. U
denotes the reservation utility of the corresponding
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problem means that an advanced country maximizes its
economic welfare guaranteeing the minimal utility level of
the counterpart developing country at the level of U . The
first term of (6) is the developed-country’s utility derived
from this emission trading, and the term within the square











By using εlj and E, Ψ can be transformed into








Then by the symmetry of Ψ, the optimality condition
for the above contract problem under perfect informa-
tion and symmetric equilibrium can be represented as
F 0 ekl













P ¼ U þΨ e→
 
¼ U þ θ 2ð Þ⋅ne
¼ U þ θ 2ð Þ⋅e þ n−1½ θ 2ð Þ⋅e≡ U þ T 2ð Þ
þ n−1½ θ 2ð Þ⋅e:
ð10Þ




 is the unit carbon price in this trading
scheme.
This scheme can be regarded as the ideal offset-trade
scheme. The carbon price should be determined as the
sum of the marginal disutility from the global warming
of two countries with partnership. The transfer from a
developed country is, aside from the direct payment for
carbon emissions T(2), the sum of the reservation utility
of the developing country in concern U and the pecuni-
ary nuisance from emissions of other developed coun-
tries as a whole [n − 1]θ(2)⋅ e*.
We must note that such an ideal system does not re-
quire setting the baseline of the project, which is un-
avoidable in the current system. Since the procedures
for such setting is very much complicated and lapses
much time, it seems to be desirable to transform the
existing offset trading scheme to that based on the for-
mulae (9) and (10).Universal proportional carbon tax
Formatting a universal proportional carbon tax scheme






















The above problem means that an advanced country
maximizes its economic utility presuming it provides the
rest of the world with the minimal utility U . It is clear that
the attained allocation under such a scheme is Pareto effi-
cient by definition. By the symmetry of the problem, it is
also clear that every Lagrangean multiplier under optimal
planning takes the value unityc. Thus, we obtain the follow-
ing formula concerning the optimal emission:









This is the modified Samuelson (1954) rule concerning
the optimal public good (bad) provision: The marginal
benefit accrued from the country’s emissions αF ' (e*)
should be equalized to the sum of the marginal disutility





. The right-hand side
of (12) is the optimal tax rate common to all constituents.
Welfare ordering for various emission suppressing measures
Although it is clear that a proportional carbon tax, with
the rate expressed by (12), is the first-best policy, it is
important to understand the manner in which the other
two measures are ordered in terms of Pareto efficiency.
We can deal with this problem by using the symmetry
and linear homogeneity of Ψ.
The utility of each country Ukl can be written as





¼ αF e jð Þð Þ−n ∂ψ
∂cl1
jεkl ¼1n ⋅e
 jð Þ: ð13Þ









⋅e jð Þ > 0; 1≤ j < nð Þ
dUkl jð Þ
dj









⋅e jð Þ < 0; n < jð Þ
ð14Þ
holds. Thus, it is clear from the above equations that the
bilateral emission trading scheme Pareto-dominates a
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a proportional carbon tax rate at its discretion.
This fact implies that although a proportional carbon
tax possibly attains the first-best allocation, emission
trading is the second-best measure, unless all countries
concur about the seriousness of global warming, in
which case a much higher carbon tax rate than that in
the unilateral case can be adopted. In addition, since n is
likely to far exceed two, the suppression effect of emis-
sion trading is estimated to be rather restrictive from the
view point of the first-best allocation.
Welfare analysis of emission-saving technological
progress
Consider the effect of emission-saving technological pro-
gress to the world economy as a whole. This progress is
expressed by an increase in α in this model. Before pro-
ceeding to the general equilibrium analysis, we must
note that every trading pair increases emissions in con-
junction with technological progress. Although it seems
to be counterintuitive, if we note the fact that techno-
logical progress makes the imputed price of CO2
cheaper as shown by the right-hand sides of (5), (9), and
(12), it is natural that emission-saving technological pro-
gress conversely heightens the accumulation of CO2.
With this precaution in mind, we shall proceed with
the general equilibrium analysis, into which the mutual
negative externalities between trading pairs are woven.
Then, from (13) and the envelop theorem, we obtain
dUdj
dα

















where η is the elasticity of the emission volume to the
unit of the technological progress. Since αF(e*) −Ψ > 0, if
η is small enough and the increase in the emission
generated by the technological progress is not so
seriousd, the advance in the emission-saving technology
improves worldwide utility, although this advance also
increases the total amount of CO2 emissions. This fact is
underscored in that when we extend the scope of
analysis to dynamic and intergenerational emission
allocation (e.g., Otaki 2013), we may have to modify the
obtained result, because the acceleration in emissions
diffuses the negative externality to future generations.
In other words, although the emission-saving techno-
logical progress lowers the imputed price of CO2
and stimulates the current generation’s consumption,
such current prosperity may conversely worsen the de-
scendants’ utility via the resulting massive emissions.However, such a dynamic prospect is beyond of the
scope of this article, and itself requires solving the simul-
taneous optimization concerning intertemporal and
international emission problems.
On income distribution between countries: the possibility
of nonlinear pricing
Thus far, this article has assumed that a developed coun-
try directly invests in the corresponding developing
country and that it receives revenues after deducting the
carbon tax. Thus,
αF e jð Þð Þ−j⋅ ∂ψ
∂el1
jεkl ¼1n⋅e
 jð Þ≡αF eð Þ−τ jð Þ⋅e jð Þ; ð16Þ
where τj is the carbon tax rate, which is identical to the
unit carbon price in emission trading. Hence, the
developing country obtains tax revenuesR (j), which
amount to
R jð Þ≡τ jð Þ⋅e jð Þ; ð17Þ
from the investing developed country.
Since every constraint concerning the joint utility from
such a trading scheme binds whenever planning is opti-
mal (see Uzawa 1958), the net surplus from the trading
in terms of consumption becomes Um e. Although we
have not yet analyzed the possibility of additional lump-
sum transfer from the investing developed country to its
counterpart developing country (or the transfer inverted
direction, which is possible if the tax payment is too
heavy for the developed country), one cannot envisage a
universal proportional carbon tax without some fair div-
ision of the surplus earned by direct investment through
this lump-sum transfer, specifically because the standard
of living of the remitting /recipient country depends de-
cisively on its share of this surplus (Uzawa 2003).
Hereafter this article analyzes both directions of the
transfer and clarifies how the direction affects the effect-
ive tax rate. First, consider the transfer from the devel-
oped country to the developing country. This is an
application of nonlinear pricing, which appears in basic
microeconomics (e.g., see Tirole 1988). Let the sum of
the transfer be s. Then, the total payment of a developed
country to her counterpart T becomes
T≡τ jð Þe jð Þ þ s ¼ τ jð Þ þ s
e jð Þ
 	
⋅e jð Þ: ð18Þ
The term within the square brackets is the effective tax
rate, which is illustrated by Figure 1. Thus, the effective
tax rate is digressive although such a transfer enriches
the developing country. This is owing to the economy of
scale from the de-facto massive purchase of the right of
emission.
Figure 1 The effective tax rate (Digressive Case: s > 0).
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the inverted transfer from the developing country to the
developed country (s < 0). It is apparent that the effective
tax rate becomes progressive despite impoverishing the
developing country. The progressive effective tax rate
owes its existence entirely to the diseconomy of scale
concerning emissions. However, we must still note that
whether the effective tax rate is progressive or otherwise
does not affect the efficacy of emission allocation. More-
over, this discussion exemplifies that the progressive taxFigure 2 The effective tax rate (Digressive Case: s < 0).rate is not necessarily advantageous to the developing
country.
Conclusions
This article compared the static efficiency of the
consumption/emission allocation of three alternative
emission control measures (proportional carbon tax
(unilateral or universal) and emission trading)f. A unilat-
eral carbon tax, akin to a symmetric Nash equilibrium of
the worldwide consumption/emission game, is less effi-
cient than bilateral carbon emission trading. Although a
universal proportional carbon tax, into which the entire
negative externalities of the emissions of a country are
woven, achieves the Pareto efficient allocation, realizing
such an ideal tax system at this time appears very diffi-
cult. That is because the tax rate would become ex-
tremely high, much higher than the incumbent tax rate
or price of emission right. As such, gradualism seems in-
evitable. The transition from bilateral to multilateral
emission trading is desirable. Thus, a universal propor-
tional carbon tax should be considered as the ultimate
solution, and an enabling political arena is needed to
gradually establish the system.
Finally, it is inevitable that an emission-saving techno-
logical progress stimulates not only consumption but
also emissions. Such technological progress cheapens
the imputed price of CO2. Although this possibly bodes
well for the current generation, it accelerates CO2 accu-
mulation and translates into a negative inheritance for
our descendants.
Methods
Three measures for suppressing CO2 emission are com-
pared from the viewpoint of Pareto efficiency: a unilat-
eral proportional carbon tax, a bilateral or trilateral
emission trading, and a universal proportional carbon
tax. Heightened consumption within a country increases
its utility at the cost of scattering more voluminous CO2
all over the world and accelerating global warming. In
this sense, there is a serious trade-off between consump-
tion and CO2 emissions, and thus this induces excess
consumption/emission owing to the negative external-
ities, which are inherent to emissions.
The above three measures are modeled using a basic
social planning theory under certainty, and are devel-
oped for suppressing excessive economic activity. The
characteristics of these measures are classified by the ex-
tent of the negative externalities that a developed coun-
try cares to address when it emits CO2. A unilateral
proportional carbon tax scheme is only concerned with
the country’s own disutility from its emissions. A bilat-
eral or trilateral emission trading scheme limits the
country’s concern to itself and its counterpart developing
country, while a universal proportional carbon tax
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ity caused by its emissions.Endnotes
aUnited States Environmental Protect Agency (2003)
classified emission trading into three categories: (i) cap and
trade, (ii) project-based trade, (iii) rate-based trade. The off-
set trade is corresponds to the second category. My analysis
concentrates and theorizes this category of emission trade.
Offset Quality Initiative (2008) indicates how the quality of
emission offsetting measure is assessed.
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (2012) figures out how the clean development
mechanism (CDM) actually works.
bThe linear homogeneity assumption is introduced by
facilitating the calculation. We can easily extend the
class of Ψ into the homothetic function. However, we
need additional information on Ψ.
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¼ n−p½  þ Sp⇒λk
00
s00 ¼ 1 . This is a
contradiction. Therefore, λkl ¼ 1; ∀l; k.
dOtherwise, the welfare is conversely aggravated by the
emission-saving technological progress under second-best
emission control systems. This is a fallacy of composition.
eSince our utility function is quasi linear, the surplus is
equivalent to that in terms of the utility. In addition,
since we presume that the equilibrium is symmetric, the
reservation utility Um is endogenously determined. This
result comes from the required property that all optimal
Lagrangean multipliers should take the value unity.
fThis article studies how far emissions of CO2 are permis-
sible with the remaining given volume of CO2 in the atmos-
phere. As such, estimating the dynamic and cumulative
effects of CO2 is beyond the scope of this article. While
Otaki (2013) considered this problem, he neglected theproblem of the efficient allocation of emissions on an inter-
national basis.Competing interests
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